Lecture on Chinese Culture & Politics (2)/ 中華文化與政治 (二)

Special Lecture by George Yong-Boon Yeo, Minister for Trade & Industry, Singapore (Part 2)	中華文化與政治   (二)
At the Golden Jubilee Anniversary of New Asia College, Chinese University of Hong Kong, on 29 Oct 1999	新加坡貿工部長楊榮文在香港中文大學新亞書院 金禧紀念專題講座上的演講(1999-10-29)
Weakness of Independent Chinese Civil Society	軟弱的華人公民社會
In the Confucianist classic The Great Learning, we learn to cultivate the self, establish the family and govern the state, thereby bringing harmony to human society. At one end, we have the individual and the family; at the other we have the state as one big happy family. In reality, between the Chinese family and the Chinese state, there is a big disconnection. In western society, the space in between the family and the state is usually occupied by relatively independent civil society. This civil society makes possible Western democracy. In Chinese society, civil society is more problematic. When civil society is independent, the state takes a negative view of it because it dilutes central power. When central authority is strong, Chinese civil groups instinctively look to it for support and patronage. Without firm leadership, Chinese civil groups often suffer from internal conflict as individuals and groups jostle for control and official favour. This is a phenomenon which affects Chinese civil groups all over the world, including Singapore. In the journal Foreign Affairs, Francis Fukuyama described the same phenomenon from a different perspective. He traced it to the lack of “social capital” in Chinese society.	儒家經典《大學》教導我們“修身、齊家、治國、平天下”：一端是個人、家庭；另一端是邦國、天下這個幸福的大家庭。實際上，在華人的家與國之間有一大脫節。在西方社會，家與國之間的空檔通常爲相對獨立的公民社會所填補，而正是這公民社會造成了西方的民主政治。在華人環境裏，公民社會問題多多。當它獨立時，國家視之為有害無益，因爲它沖淡了中央的權力；中央權力强大時，民間社團本能地向權力尋求支持、庇護。這些社團缺乏有力的領導層，個人之間、團體之間往往奪權爭寵，使團體陷入內部紛爭。這種現象影響華人的公民社團，在世界各地都是如此，新加坡也不例外。不久前在《外交事務》(Foreign Affairs)雙月刊上，有學者福山(Francis Fukuyama)所撰一文論述這一現象，作者別具視角，將它歸因於華人社會中缺乏所謂“社會資本”。
What is the reason for weak Chinese civil society? This is an important question because without strong civil society, Western-style democratic cannot take root. The weakness of Chinese civil society is a direct result of the strength of the family on the one hand and the centralised state on the other. Independent groups are hard to organise because of the lack of public spirit outside the family and state structure. These tendencies are deeply coded in Chinese culture and not easily changed. They are in the cultural DNA and shape the political institutions governing Chinese society. One way or another, democracy in Chinese society must take these tendencies into account. How democracy with Chinese characteristics will evolve in the next century is an important question in global history. I doubt very much that Western democratic systems will take root in China because the history and tradition are so different. Some scholars recommend a federal system for China, but that is not likely to succeed because of the idea of one China.	華人的公民社會軟弱無力，原因何在呢？這個問題很重要，因爲若無强勁的公民社會，西方式的民主便無法生根立足。華人公民社會軟弱的直接原因，一方面是家庭的强大，另一方面是中央政權的强大。在家庭與政權的構架之外，華人的公衆意識不足，獨立的社團很難組織起來。這一特性深植於中華文化之中，很不容易改變。它蘊藏在文化遺傳物質中，統治着華人社會的種種政治制度，便由此衍生出來。無論從哪一方看，要在華人社會裏推行民主政治，就必須考慮這一特性。下一世紀裏，具有中國特色的民主如何演進，將是世界歷史上的大事。西方民主制度能否在中國立足生根，我是十分懷疑的，因爲中國的歷史與傳統是如此不同。有學者建議中國實行聯邦制，但這不太可能成功，因爲它有違“一個中國”的觀念。
Genius of Chinese Statecraft	華人的治國之道
The genius of Chinese society is in statecraft. Without this genius, China could not have re-constituted itself again and again. I would like to highlight some key aspects of Chinese statecraft.	華人社會有治國安邦的天賦之才。若無這份天才，中國不可能一次次地復興重建。我且來講一講華人的治國之道有何重大特色。
The first aspect is the separation of religion from politics. In many countries religion remains an important part of politics making governance more difficult. In South Asia today, we have in India a self-conscious Hindu government, and in Pakistan an army that has become more Islamic over the years now in control. In Western Europe, religious wars decimated entire populations right up to the 17th century. In Eastern Europe, religion is still an important factor in politics, no more so than in the Balkans. In contrast, the Chinese state has been secular for most of China's history. Communist atheism took easy root in China partly because it conformed to Chinese political culture. Confucius advised that the state should keep religion at arm's length.	第一項特色是政教分離。在許多國家裏，宗教是政治的重要一環，這就給治國增添了困難。在今日南亞，印度政府有濃厚的興都教意識，而巴基斯坦的軍隊掌權數年來也日益伊斯蘭化。迄至17世紀時，西歐各國人口因歷次宗教戰爭而死亡慘重；在東歐，宗教至今仍是政治的要素，巴爾幹諸國尤其如此。相比之下，中國歷朝歷代大多是世俗政權統治。共產黨的無神論能够輕易在中國生根，部分原因即在於它與固有的政治文化吻合。孔子“敬鬼神而遠之”，主張國事應遠離宗教。
Another important aspect of Chinese statecraft is recruitment of officials on the basis of examinations. When the civil service was invented in China, it was a revolutionary idea in the world. It was only 200 to 300 years ago that this idea found its way to the West. Now it is universally accepted around the world. But nowhere in the world, except in China, is this elitist system extended over such a wide geographical area and to such a degree. In the Chinese mind, that the provincial governor could be from another province is culturally acceptable. One cannot imagine in Europe today, despite the European Union, that a German could become the mayor of Paris, much less, the president of France. In China, this cross-posting from one end of the empire to the other has been done for over 2,000 years. During the Tang Dynasty, a few prime ministers were of non-Han origin. A Korean general led the Tang army across the Tianshan mountains into Central Asia where it was defeated by the Arabs. A Japanese jinshi governed Vietnam, then a part of the Chinese Empire.	華人治國的另一特色是，通過科舉取士委任官吏。文官制度首創於中國，當時是全世界的觀念革新；它遲至二三百年前才進入西方，今天已全球通行。若就這一精英制度施行的地域之廣、貫徹之深而論，世界各地無一超過中國。在中國的文化觀念中，一省的督撫，完全可以出身於另一省。在今日歐洲，儘管有歐洲聯盟的組織，仍無法想像一個德國人可以擔任巴黎市長，更不用說擔任法國總統了。在中華帝國的疆域之內，官員遠地互調，已經施行了二千餘年。有唐一代，若干任宰相並非漢人；某一名高麗（今韓國、朝鮮）將領率唐軍跨越天山遠征西域，在中亞地區被阿拉伯人擊敗；統領交趾（今越南，曾入唐帝國版圖）的官員爲進士出身，是個日本人。
Chinese statecraft always recognised the problem of corruption and nepotism. By various means, the Chinese state set up systems to limit this problem. But it could never be got rid of completely because of the strength of family ties. During the Ming and Qing dynasties and in China today, high officials are not posted to the districts they come from, not within a distance of 500 li. By this rule, no Singaporean could be a minister in Singapore, and no Hongkonger should be governing Hong Kong. This point is worth reflecting on. In China, a high official working in his native district would face unbearable pressure to favour relatives and friends. Therefore, it is always better to bring in an outsider who can be objective. But this outsider is not a foreigner. He is still Chinese and therefore legitimate. Such an outsider would not be acceptable as a high official in a European country or in Singapore. In Hong Kong under one-country-two-systems, Hongkongers are supposed to govern themselves. This is only possible because the public institutions of Hong Kong are derived from the British, which is also the case in Singapore.	中國的執政者歷來也看到貪污腐敗、任人唯親的弊端，並想方設法確立制度加以抑制，然而始終無法杜絕，其癥結在於家庭紐帶太强。明清兩朝迄於現代，中國高官依例不得在其原籍地五百里之內任職。若照此規矩，則新加坡人不可擔任本國的部長，而港人也不該治港了。這一點很值得思考。在中國，高官若任職於原籍地，將面臨無窮的壓力，礙於親戚故舊的情面，難免徇私枉法。因此，調派外人來任職，總是較能秉公辦事。但外人仍是中國人而非外國人，因此仍爲合法。這樣的調派外人任職，在歐洲國家或者新加坡是行不通的。在香港也不行，因爲一國兩制之下，港人應自己治港。香港的做法可行，只因爲其政府體制來源於英國人。新加坡的情形也是如此。
A system which enables high officials to be posted from one corner of the empire to another can only be achieved if power is concentrated at the centre. This has long been an essential aspect of Chinese statecraft. The Leninist method of organisation was in line with that political tradition which explains why it was easily transplanted onto Chinese soil. In fact, both the Communist Party and the Kuomingtang adapted Leninist party organisation. The People’s Action Party in Singapore also developed the same method of organisation because it had to fight the Communist Party of Malaya. Certain cultural characteristics are persistent.	帝國疆域之內，高官遠地調派，只有在權力高度集中的制度下才有可能，而這歷來是中國政治的又一大特色。列寧主義政黨的組織方式恰好與此傳統吻合，因此很容易移植到了中國。其實，中國的共產黨、國民黨都仿效列寧主義政黨的組織方式並加以改動，新加坡人民行動黨的組織方式也同樣由此而來，因爲當時它要對馬來亞共產黨作鬥爭。某些文化特質是會持續下去的。
In the next century, China will have to move towards more democratic organisation, the rule of law and constitutional governance. It will evolve its own system taking ideas from the West and adapting them to Chinese conditions. The technological revolution sweeping the world also requires the Chinese state to devolve more power downwards and to empower as many individuals as possible. These changes are unavoidable if China is to be economically strong. Without economic strength, the Chinese state will be weak. Once the Chinese state declines, it will eventually break up and society will be in chaos once again.  [To be continued; see Part (1), Part (3)]	下個世紀裏，中國將必須轉向較為民主的組織方式，實行法治和憲政。中國將吸納西方的觀念，並參照自身的國情加以調整，從而發展出自己的制度來。席捲世界的科技革命，將要求中國的執政者進一步下放權力，儘量授權給個人。中國若要在經濟上强大，這一轉變就無可避免；而若無强大的經濟，中國政權必將虛弱。一旦政權衰敗，中國終將分崩離析，社會再度陷入動亂。 [待續；見 Part (1), Part (3)] (Translated by Allen Zhuang)
[ 楊榮文以英語演講，華文譯本兩天之後(1999-10-31)載新加坡《聯合早報》社論/言論/天下事 /; The lecture was in English; its Chinese translation appeared two days later in Lianhe Zaobao (Oct 31, 1999).]